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1
What is New, and Permanent, 
about the “New Economy”?
THE END OF “THE ORGANIZATION MAN”
The Internet boom of the last half of the 1990s seemed to herald the 
arrival of a “New Economy” with its promise that, after the stagnation 
of the early 1990s, innovation in information and communication tech-
nologies (ICT) would regenerate economic prosperity. The sharp eco-
nomic downturn in 2001–2002 called into question the New Economy’s 
ability to deliver on this promise—and it even raised questions about 
whether there had really been anything “new” about the economy of the 
late 1990s after all. Perhaps the journalist John Cassidy (2002) was cor-
rect to title his book on the Internet boom Dot.con: The Greatest Story 
Ever Sold. If the New Economy was all smoke and mirrors, one would 
expect that, once the debris left behind by the storm of speculation and 
corruption had been cleared away, economic life would return to what 
it had been before the boom took place.
It is now clear that there was plenty of e-con in the New Economy. 
At the same time, however, there was something new, important, and 
permanent about the New Economy that transformed the economic 
lives of many from those they had led before. The core of that some-
thing new, important, and permanent is what I call the “New Economy 
business model” (NEBM), a mode of organizing business enterprises 
that has dramatically changed the ways in which, and terms on which, 
people in the United States are employed and, indeed, the way in which 
the U.S. economy operates. 
NEBM emanated from Silicon Valley and spread to other regions of 
the United States. NEBM also affected employment relations in other 
areas of the world, especially Europe and Asia, as U.S.-based ICT com-
panies extended their global reach and as high-tech companies based 
outside the United States sought to adopt elements of the new busi-
ness model. With well-educated high-tech labor fl owing into the United 
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States from abroad (especially from India and China) and with U.S.-
based ICT companies offshoring various types of business activities 
to other countries (again especially to India and China), the ICT labor 
force had become vastly more globalized by the 2000s than it had been 
prior to the Internet revolution.
Although the Internet boom of the late 1990s made the New Econo-
my a household phrase, the end of the boom did not result in the demise 
of NEBM. To the contrary, its characteristic features have become more 
widespread and entrenched in U.S. high-tech industries in the 2000s. 
With its start-up fi rms, vertical specialists, venture capital, and highly 
mobile labor, NEBM is a business model that remains dominant in the 
United States, and it is one that many national policymakers and corpo-
rate executives around the world seek to emulate. 
At the same time, within the United States, it is a business model 
that has been associated with volatile stock markets, unequal incomes, 
and unstable employment, including the insecurity associated with the 
offshoring of high-skill jobs. If we defi ne “sustainable prosperity” as a 
state of economic affairs in which growth results in stable employment 
and an equitable distribution of income, then U.S. economic prosper-
ity would appear to be unsustainable. There is a need to understand the 
organizational and industrial dynamics of NEBM to determine how the 
tapping of its innovative capability might be rendered compatible with 
more socially desirable outcomes.
The “Old Economy business model” (OEBM) that dominated the 
U.S. corporate economy in the decades after World War II and into the 
1980s offered employment that was far more stable and earnings that 
were far more equitable than employment and earnings in the NEBM 
era. The sociological foundation of OEBM was “the organization man.” 
Popularized in the United States in the 1950s (Whyte 1956), the stereo-
typical organization man was a white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant male 
who had obtained a college education right after high school, secured 
a well-paying job with an established company early in his career, and 
then worked his way up and around the corporate hierarchy over three 
or four decades of employment, with a substantial defi ned-benefi t pen-
sion, complemented by highly subsidized medical coverage, awaiting 
him on retirement.1 The employment stability offered by an established 
corporation was highly valued, while interfi rm labor mobility was 
shunned.
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The organization man could trace his origins back to the early 
decades of the twentieth century, and in the immediate post–World War 
II decades he was ubiquitous in the offi ces of U.S. corporate enterpris-
es. Somewhat ironically, when formidable Japanese competitors con-
fronted U.S.-based Old Economy companies in the 1980s, many U.S. 
observers of Japan’s “lifetime employment” system viewed it as a mode 
of organization that was quite alien to the American way of life. During 
the fi rst half of twentieth century, however, U.S. corporations had trans-
formed the salaried professional, technical, and administrative employ-
ees who peopled the managerial structure into organization men. By 
the 1950s and 1960s, moreover, even unionized production workers, 
ostensibly paid on an “hourly” rather than salaried basis, found that 
collective bargaining protected their positions of seniority, so that they 
too experienced, and in a growing economy came to expect, lifetime 
employment as well as defi ned-benefi t pensions and comprehensive 
health benefi ts, just like the salaried managers of the companies for 
which they worked.
From this historical perspective, NEBM can best be described as 
“the end of the organization man.” It is not that New Economy compa-
nies have ceased to build complex and durable organizations. To attain 
and sustain competitive advantage, companies such as Intel, Microsoft, 
and Cisco—the blue-chip enterprises of the New Economy—need to 
integrate the labor services of tens of thousands of individuals who 
participate in complex hierarchical and functional divisions of labor. 
In an innovative enterprise, the role of an integrated division of labor 
is to develop and utilize new technologies. Indeed, one might argue 
that, given heightened technological complexity and intensifi ed market 
competition in the ICT world of “open systems,” the building of unique 
organizational capabilities has become more, not less, critical to the 
success of the enterprise (Lazonick 2008a). 
Nor is it necessarily the case that employees who spend their entire 
careers with one company have become an endangered species. The 
leading industrial corporations still have low levels of employee turn-
over. Rather, what is new is the lack of a commitment, explicit or implic-
it, on the part of U.S. high-tech companies to provide their employees 
with stable employment, skill formation, and rewarding careers. When 
an employee begins to work for a company in the New Economy, he 
or she has no expectation of a career with that particular enterprise. 
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Nor does a person with high-tech capabilities necessarily want to work 
for one company for years and decades on end. Interfi rm labor mobil-
ity can bring benefi ts to an employee, including working for a smaller 
company, choice of geographical location, a signifi cant increase in sal-
ary, access to employee stock options, and new learning experiences. 
The NEBM represents dramatically diminished organizational commit-
ment on both sides of the employment relation as compared with its Old 
Economy predecessor. 
A corollary of this diminution in organizational commitment under 
NEBM has been an increased globalization of the types of labor that 
U.S.-based ICT fi rms employ. This globalization of labor has occurred 
through the offshoring of high-tech work and the international mobil-
ity of high-tech labor, neither of which is a new phenomenon, but both 
of which have intensifi ed over the past decade or so. The employment 
relations of major U.S.-based ICT companies have become thorough-
ly globalized, based on corporate strategies that benefi t from not only 
lower wages but also the enhancement of ICT skill levels in non-U.S. 
locations, especially in Asia. 
While the extent of these impacts of NEBM on high-tech employ-
ment has become evident only since the last half of the 1990s, NEBM 
itself has taken a half-century to unfold. Indeed, its origins can be 
found in the mid-1950s, at precisely the time when the Old Economy 
industrial corporation was at the pinnacle of its power. The evolution 
of NEBM was integral to the microelectronics revolution. The devel-
opment of computer chips since the late 1950s provided the techno-
logical foundation for the microcomputer revolution beginning in the 
late 1970s, which in turn created the technological infrastructure for the 
commercialization of the Internet in the 1990s. Although the U.S. gov-
ernment and the research laboratories of established Old Economy cor-
porations played major, and indeed indispensable, roles in supporting 
these developments, each wave of innovation generated opportunities 
for the emergence of start-up companies that were to become central to 
the commercialization of the new technologies. 
The regional concentration of these new ventures in what would 
become known by the beginning of the 1970s as Silicon Valley rein-
forced the emergence of a distinctive business model. From the late 
1960s, venture capitalists backed so many high-tech start-ups in the 
vicinity of Stanford University that they created a whole new indus-
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try for fostering the growth of young technology fi rms. These start-ups 
lured “talent” from established companies by offering them compensa-
tion in the form of stock options, typically as a partial substitute for 
salaries, with the potential payoff being the high market value of the 
stock after an initial public offering (IPO) or the private sale of the 
young fi rm to an established corporation. 
As these young companies grew, annual grants of stock options to 
a broad base of potentially highly mobile people became an important 
tool for retaining existing employees as well as attracting new ones. 
The subsequent growth of these companies occurred, moreover, not 
only by investing more capital in new facilities and hiring more people 
but also by acquiring even newer high-tech companies, almost invari-
ably using their own stock rather than cash as the acquisition currency. 
In addition, wherever and whenever possible, ICT companies were sys-
tem integrators that designed, tested, and marketed fi nal products, while 
outsourcing the manufacture of components so that they could focus on 
higher value-added work. This outsourcing strategy became both more 
economical and more effi cient over time as specialized contract manu-
facturers developed their capabilities, including their global organiza-
tions and highly automated production processes, for a larger extent of 
the market. 
These features of the new ICT business model were already evident 
to industry observers in the late 1980s. It was only in the Internet boom 
of the last half of the 1990s, however, that this business model had a 
suffi cient impact on new fi rm formation, product market competition, 
interfi rm labor mobility, and productivity to give popular defi nition to a 
New Economy. In this book, I document the evolution of NEBM over 
the past half-century as a foundation for understanding the origins of 
the globalization of high-tech employment in the 2000s and its implica-
tions for high-tech employment opportunities in the United States. 
NEBM has defi nitively replaced OEBM as the dominant mode of 
business organization in the ICT industries of the United States. NEBM 
has been, and continues to be, an important engine of innovation in 
the U.S. economy, and hence an important source of economic growth. 
The performance of an economy, however, is not measured by growth 
alone. Economists give high marks to an economy that not only gener-
ates growth but does so in a way that provides stable employment and 
an equitable income distribution—what I call “sustainable prosperity.” 
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Yet over the past decade or so, NEBM has been an engine of innovation 
that, as I show in this book, has contributed to instability and inequity. 
ICT continues to help make the United States the richest economy in the 
world, in terms of both absolute and per capita income. The increased 
dominance of NEBM in the organization of the ICT industries, howev-
er, has meant increasingly insecure employment and incomes for most 
workers in this sector, and it has become an important factor in the 
trend toward greater employment instability and income inequality in 
the U.S. economy as a whole.
Following the Internet boom and bust, what has been particularly 
novel about the employment situation of the 2000s thus far is the extent 
to which this insecurity has affl icted highly educated and experienced 
members of the U.S. ICT labor force, as their former employers prefer 
to hire younger high-tech workers in the United States. At the same 
time, companies are also offshoring to lower-wage locations the types of 
high-skill jobs that Americans had thought could never be done abroad. 
In terms of their education and qualifi cations, the U.S. high-tech work-
ers who suffer employment insecurity under NEBM are the types of 
people who in another era would have been the prototypical organi-
zation men, although they are no longer so uniformly white, Anglo-
Saxon, Protestant, or male, as the organization men of the 1950s were 
apt to be. The public outcry against the “export of American jobs” in 
this fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century in effect laments the demise 
of the organization man. 
In this book I explain the origins of this new era of employment 
insecurity and income inequality, and I consider what governments, 
businesses, and individuals can do about it. I ask whether the United 
States can refashion its high-tech business model to generate stable and 
equitable economic growth. Across the globe, government policymak-
ers and corporate executives generally view the U.S. business model, 
with its innovative power, as one that, if only it could be implemented 
in their own nations and regions, would make their countries and com-
munities big and strong. If the U.S. economy, including the business 
model that dominates the way in which it allocates resources, is to serve 
as an exemplar for the rest of the world, it is incumbent upon those of 
us who analyze its operation and seek to infl uence its performance to 
understand why it is failing to contribute to stable and equitable eco-
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nomic growth in the United States and what can be done to improve 
this record.
This book represents a step in my own quest to understand the insti-
tutional and organizational conditions under which an advanced econ-
omy—not only the U.S. economy—can achieve sustainable prosperity. 
Analogously, although I focus on the origins, operation, and impact of 
the dominant ICT industries, my interest is not in the operation and 
performance of the ICT sector per se. Rather, I have studied the ICT 
industries closely because they have been at the core of the innovative 
capability of the U.S. economy over much of the past century, especial-
ly over the past few decades. In order to grow, the economy needs inno-
vation, which I defi ne in economic terms as the generation of higher-
quality, lower-cost goods and services than were previously available 
at prevailing factor prices. Innovation does not, however, necessarily 
result in sustainable prosperity. In this book I ask what types of national 
institutions and business organizations support the innovation process, 
and what are the implications of this national innovation system for 
employment stability and income equality in the economy as a whole.
INNOVATION AND GROWTH IN THE U.S. ECONOMY
The United States is the world’s largest economy, with a gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita that surpasses those of all other 
developed nations. Table 1.1 shows the growth of real GDP per capita 
from 1950 to 2006 (in 1990 international dollars) in the United States 
and other large advanced economies, some smaller advanced econo-
mies, and some of the most rapidly growing developing economies. 
These data show varying rates of change in GDP per capita, which sug-
gests that the nation still matters as a unit of analysis for economic 
growth even in a globalized era (Lazonick 2007a). 
The most dramatic success story of the last half of the twentieth 
century is that of Japan, which emerged from a state of devastation 
after World War II to become, in terms of total GDP, the second larg-
est advanced economy by 1970 (see Maddison 2007). Japan became 
rich by transferring technology from abroad, primarily from the United 
States, and then developing and utilizing that technology to generate 
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Real GDPa
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006
United States $9,561 $11,328 $15,030 $18,577 $23,201 $28,403 $30,983 
United States (298.4)b 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Japan (127.5) 20 35 65 72 81 73 73
Canada (33.1) 76 77 80 87 81 79 80
France (61.7) 55 67 78 81 78 74 72
Germany (82.7) 41 68 72 76 69 67 65
Italy (58.1) 37 52 65 71 70 66 63
United Kingdom (60.6) 73 76 72 70 71 71 74
Finland (5.2) 44 55 64 70 73 70 75
Netherlands (16.5) 63 73 80 79 74 78 75
Norway (4.6) 57 64 67 81 80 88 90
Sweden (9.0) 70 77 85 80 76 72 77
Switzerland (7.5) 95 110 112 101 93 79 76
South Korea (48.8) 9 11 14 22 38 50 58
Taiwan (23.0) 10 13 20 32 43 60 64
China (1,310.8) 5 6 5 6 8 12 21
India (1,095.4) 6 7 6 5 6 7 8
a 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars.
b 2006 population (in millions) in parentheses; United States = 100, for any year. 
SOURCE: Maddison (2007); Conference Board (2008).
Table 1.1  Real GDP per Capita in Selected Nations Compared with the United States, 1950–2006  
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higher-quality, lower-cost products than the United States was capable 
of producing. What is remarkable about Japan’s success is that, through 
innovation, it ultimately gained competitive advantage over the United 
States in the 1970s and 1980s in industries (such as mass-produced 
automobiles, consumer electronics, machine tools, steel, and semicon-
ductors) in which the United States had reigned supreme in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Although low wages and long work hours (along with the oil 
crisis and the consequent demand for small, fuel-effi cient cars) helped 
Japan capture U.S. markets in the 1970s, the proof that Japan had devel-
oped a highly innovative economy was its ability to extend its competi-
tive advantage in the late 1970s and 1980s even as its wage rates rose 
substantially (as refl ected in the GDP per capita fi gures in Table 1.1). 
Indeed, in the mid-1990s, the Japanese even began to work fewer hours 
per year on average than Americans (International Labour Organization 
1999).
Since the 1980s, the Japanese challenge to U.S. dominance in high-
technology and capital-intensive industries has been repeated by a num-
ber of other Asian economies, most notably South Korea, Taiwan, and 
China. In labor-intensive information-technology services, India has 
become a formidable competitor over the past decade as well. Critical 
to the development of these economies has been not only the transfer 
of technology from the United States but also, to an extent that was 
never the case for Japan, the development of the productive capabili-
ties of nationals through graduate education and work experience in the 
United States—a phenomenon that I explore in considerable depth in 
this book.
While many of the Asian economies have been catching up, the 
United States remains a highly innovative economy in the 2000s. Real 
GDP per capita grew by an annual average of 3.04 percent in the 1960s, 
2.18 percent in the 1970s, 2.10 percent in the 1980s, 1.86 percent in the 
1990s, and 1.49 percent in the 2000s. Whatever problems there may 
be with the U.S. economy in the 2000s, they are not problems that, 
averaged over the whole population, result from a lack of productive 
power. At the same time, the United States has experienced a long-term 
trend toward a slower rate of increase in real GDP per capita alongside 
growing international competition from nations such as China and India 
that have developed enormous innovative capabilities but still have far 
lower wages than those that prevail in the United States. These changes 
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may exacerbate tendencies to instability and inequity in the U.S. econo-
my, thus making sustainable prosperity more diffi cult to attain.
Instability
From 1930 through 1941, the U.S. unemployment rate averaged 
about 17.4 percent, ranging from 8.9 percent in 1930 to 25.2 percent in 
1933 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1976, p. 126). It took the United States’ 
entry into World War II to get the nation out of the Great Depression. 
After the war, Congress passed the Employment Act of 1946, which 
placed the federal government under obligation to pursue economic 
policies to secure conditions of full employment for American citizens. 
Since then, the civilian unemployment rate has not reached double dig-
its, although it went as high as 9.7 percent in 1982 and 9.6 percent 
in 1983. As shown in Figure 1.1, the unemployment rate averaged 4.5 
percent in the 1950s, 4.8 percent in the 1960s, 6.2 percent in 1970s, 7.3 
percent in the 1980s, 5.6 percent in the 1990s, and 5.0 percent in the 
2000s (through 2007).
Although government intervention has apparently eradicated the 
possibility of another Great Depression, the rate at which Americans 
can fi nd employment is still far from stable over time, both within and 
across decades, as shown in Figure 1.1. Blacks and Hispanics experi-
ence much higher unemployment rates than whites, and in 1983 the 
black unemployment rate was at a Depression-level 19.5 percent. 
Moreover, as can also be seen in Figure 1.1, married men with spouses 
present, who as a group have among the lowest unemployment rates, 
also experience substantial fl uctuations over time in the rate at which 
they are employed.
In the era of the organization man, lengthy tenure with one compa-
ny became the foundation of employment security in the United States. 
In a recent survey of changes in job security, Henry Farber (2008, p. 1) 
stated that “there is ample evidence that long-term employment [with 
one company] is on the decline in the United States.” Using Current 
Population Survey data for 1973–2006, Farber (p. 27) showed that, 
in the 1990s and 2000s, members of the U.S. labor force experienced 
shortened job tenure, with the impact being most pronounced for males. 
Moreover, education and experience are no longer the guarantors of 
employment security that they once were. Using Displaced Worker Sur-
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vey data to analyze rates of job loss, Farber (p. 35) found that those 
with college educations had job loss rates 22 percent lower than those 
with high school educations in the 1980s, but only 12 percent lower in 
the 2000s. He also found that workers aged 45–54 had job loss rates 19 
percent higher than workers aged 20–24 in the 1980s, whereas the job 
loss rates of the older age group were 58 percent higher than those of 
the younger age group in the 2000s.
If employment incomes have become more unstable over the course 
of one’s career, so too have the fi nancial returns on accumulated wealth. 
Large numbers of Americans have substantial wealth invested in the 
stock market, not only in direct holdings but also indirectly through 
their investments in mutual funds, pensions, and insurance policies. 































































All civilian workers Males, 20 years and over
Females, 20 years and over Both sexes, 16–19 years
Whites Blacks
Hispanic or Latino ethnicity Married men, spouse present
Women who maintain families (NSA)
NOTE: Until 1972 the black unemployment rate included other races. NSA means not 
seasonally adjusted. The average annual unemployment rates for the U.S. civilian la-
bor force were as follows: 1950s, 4.5 percent; 1960s, 4.8 percent; 1970s, 6.2 percent; 
1980s, 7.3 percent; 1990s, 5.8 percent; 2000–2007, 5.0 percent.
SOURCE: U.S. Congress (2009, table B-42); U.S. Bureau of the Census (1976, p. 135).
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In 1999 holdings of corporate equities in the U.S. economy were at a 
record 211 percent of GDP, about 3.5 times the percentage in 1990, and 
holdings of corporate equities per capita were at a peak of $86,994 in 
2007 dollars (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008, 
table L213). In 2007, holdings of corporate equities per capita were 41 
percent higher in real terms than they had been in 1996, at the onset of 
the Internet boom.
In 1945 households directly held 93 percent of the value of corpo-
rate equities in the U.S. economy; by 2007 it was only 25 percent. Nev-
ertheless, in 2007, on a per capita basis, the direct holdings of house-
holds in 2007 dollars were more than 88 percent greater than in 1945. 
Pensions (private and government) held only 6 percent of corporate 
equities in 1965, but they held 28 percent in 1985. Although this share 
stood at 23 percent in 2007, a steadily increasing proportion of sav-
ings has poured into mutual funds, which represented only 5 percent of 
corporate stockholdings in 1985 but 26 percent in 2007. The growth of 
mutual funds refl ected the shift from defi ned-benefi t to defi ned-contri-
bution pensions and the trend toward the management of defi ned-con-
tribution pensions through individual retirement accounts (IRAs; see 
Chapter 4). The mutual fund share of IRA assets grew from 17 percent 
in 1985 to 49 percent in 1999. In 1999, mutual funds absorbed 30 per-
cent of defi ned-contribution assets but only 6 percent of defi ned-benefi t 
assets, and they were heavily invested in equities (Engen and Lehnert 
2000, pp. 802–803). 
Stock market returns are very unstable, not only from year to year 
but also from decade to decade, as shown in Table 1.2 (which does not 
include the negative results for 2008). The extraordinarily high price 
yields in the 1980s and 1990s lured Americans into thinking that invest-
ments in the stock market could give them long-run fi nancial security. 
High price yields may refl ect real productivity gains made by innova-
tive enterprises (as was indeed partly the case in those decades), but 
they may also refl ect a high volume of speculative stock trading that 
imparts instability to the stock market. Furthermore, when innovation 
and speculation do not sustain increases in stock prices, corporate exec-
utives, encouraged by Wall Street, may seek to do so through manipula-
tion. Hence, as I show in Chapter 6, with stock markets sluggish in the 
2000s, U.S. companies, including leading high-tech enterprises, have 
turned to large-scale stock repurchases to boost their stock prices, thus 
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redistributing income to shareholders from other stakeholders in the 
corporate economy. Yet I shall argue that, even for shareholders, stock-
price appreciation based on stock repurchases is not sustainable over 
the long run.2
Inequity
A key characteristic of OEBM was the separation of asset owner-
ship from managerial control over the allocation of corporate resources 
(Lazonick 1990, 1991). The salaries of those at the top of the corporate 
hierarchy were regulated much less by an external labor market for top 
executives than by the internal salary structure of the managerial orga-
nizations over which they presided. Managerial personnel, who gener-
ally had college educations, could look forward to promotion within 
the company over the course of their careers. When they retired, they 
would receive a guaranteed stream of income from a defi ned-benefi t 
pension plan that rewarded years of service. Clerical and production 
workers, who generally had high school educations, could also look 
forward to spending their whole working lives with the same company, 
notwithstanding the fact that they were deemed to be “hourly” rather 
than “salaried” employees. 
Research on the distribution of income in the United States has 
shown that there was a movement toward more equality in the immedi-
ate post–World War II decades that came to a halt in the mid-1970s. A 
1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–07
Real stock yield 6.63 −1.66 11.67 15.01 0.96
Price yield 5.80 1.35 12.91 15.54 2.09
Dividend yield 3.19 4.08 4.32 2.47 1.64
Change in CPIa 2.36 7.09 5.55 3.00 2.78
Real bond yield 2.65 1.14 5.79 4.72 3.34
Table 1.2  Average Annual U.S. Corporate Stock and Bond Yields (%), 
1960–2007
NOTE: Stock yields are for Standard and Poor’s composite index of 500 U.S. corporate 
stocks. Bond yields are for Moody’s AAA-rated U.S. corporate bonds.
a Consumer price index.
SOURCE: Updated from Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000a) using U.S. Congress (2009, 
tables B-62, B-3, B-95, and B-96).
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marked trend to more income inequality started with the recessionary 
years of the early 1980s and has continued to the present (see Autor, 
Katz, and Kearney 2008; Bradbury 1996; Danziger and Gottschalk 
1995; Goldin and Katz 2008; Jones and Weinberg 2000; Levy and Mur-
nane 1992; Moss 2002; Piketty and Saez 2003, 2006; Pryor 2007; Saez 
2005). These movements can be seen in Figure 1.2, which charts the 
Gini coeffi cient for households from 1947 to 2007. The Gini coeffi cient 
is a measure of the amount of income inequality. The higher the Gini 
coeffi cient, the greater the extent of income inequality across house-
holds—the coeffi cient would be 0.0 if all households had the same 
income and 1.0 if one family had all the income and the remaining 
families had no income. An improvement in income equality is discern-
ible until the mid-1970s, after which it became much worse.
A worsening in the distribution of income among households after 
the mid-1970s is also evident in Figure 1.3, which shows that the 
household income ratios of various higher to lower percentiles in the 
U.S. household income distribution have all trended upwards, with the 



























































SOURCE: Table F-4 in U.S. Census Bureau (2009).
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most marked upward trend occurring among the more extreme ratios 
(90th/10th and 95th/20th). Figure 1.4, based on data collected by Piketty 
and Saez (2006), shows that the top 1 percent of the income distribu-
tion gained a dramatically larger share of total income since 1985. The 
next 4 percent (top 2–5 percent in Figure 1.4) have also increased their 
share since the early 1980s. In 2004, 37 percent of all corporate equities 
were held by the wealthiest 1 percent of households and 80 percent by 
the top 20 percent in the wealth distribution (Allegretto 2006). And, as 
we shall see, many if not most of the ongoing increases in top executive 
pay have come from stock options as a mode of remuneration. If the 
increased reliance of households, governments, and corporations on the 
stock market has made the U.S. economy more unstable, the distribu-
tion of returns from the stock market has made the U.S. economy much 
more unequal.
Figure 1.3  Changes in the Relative Incomes of Selected Income 
Percentiles in the U.S. Distribution of Income, 1967–2007
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ICT INDUSTRIES
What is a business model, and how do OEBM and NEBM differ? 
We can defi ne a business enterprise by the product markets for which it 
competes and the ways in which it mobilizes capital and labor to com-
pete for those markets (for an elaboration, see Lazonick 2007b). Hence, 
as shown in Table 1.3, a business model can be characterized by three 
components: 1) its strategy, the types of product markets for which 
a company competes and the types of production processes through 
which it generates goods and services for these markets; 2) its fi nance, 
the ways in which it funds investments in processes and products until 
they can generate fi nancial returns; and 3) its organization, the ways in 
which it elicits skill and effort from its labor force to add value to these 
investments. 
The evolution of NEBM has been intimately related to the develop-
ment of the ICT industries in the United States. The U.S. Department 
Figure 1.4  Shares of the Top Income Earners of the Total U.S. Income, 
1913–2002
SOURCE: Piketty and Saez (2006, p. 201). Excel fi le available at http://elsa.berkeley
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OEBM NEBM
Strategy, product Growth by building on internal capabilities; 
expansion into new product markets based on 
related technologies; geographic expansion to 
access national product markets.
New fi rm entry into specialized markets; sell 
branded components to system integrators; 
accumulate new capabilities by acquiring young 
technology fi rms.
Strategy, process Development and patenting of proprietary 
technologies; vertical integration of the value 
chain at home and abroad.
Cross-license technology based on industry 
standards; vertical specialization of the value 
chain; outsourcing/offshoring of routine work.
Finance Venture fi nance from personal savings, family, 
and business associates; NYSE listing; pay 
steady dividends; growth fi nance from retentions 
leveraged with bond issues.
Organized venture capital; IPO on NASDAQ; low 
or no dividends; growth fi nance from retentions 
plus stock as an acquisition currency; stock 
repurchases to support stock price.
Organization Secure employment: career with one company; 
salaried and hourly employees; unions; defi ned-
benefi t pensions; employer-funded medical 
insurance in employment and retirement.
Insecure employment: interfi rm mobility of labor; 
broad-based stock options; nonunion; defi ned-
contribution pensions; employee bears greater 
burden of medical insurance. 
Table 1.3  Old Economy Business Model (OEBM) and New Economy Business Model (NEBM) in ICT Industries
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of Commerce (2003) has defi ned ICT industries as those engaged in 
producing computer hardware, computer software and services, com-
munications equipment, and communications services.3 According to 
the department’s report Digital Economy 2003, the output of ICT indus-
tries accounted for about 9 percent of U.S. GDP in 2000 at the peak of 
the Internet boom and about 8 percent in the early 2000s (Henry and 
Dalton 2003, p. 16). 
Employment in U.S. ICT industries increased by 51.9 percent from 
1993 to 2000, compared with a 20.8 percent increase for all business-
sector industries. In 2000 these industries employed a total of 5.38 mil-
lion people, representing 4.8 percent of employment by all U.S. busi-
ness-sector industries. Although ICT employment declined by 0.6 per-
cent in 2001 and by 10.7 percent in 2002, ICT industries still employed 
4.78 million people, or 4.4 percent of employment in the U.S. business 
sector, in 2002 (Cooke 2003, pp. 21–22). According to Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) data, ICT-producing industries, which do not 
include communications services,4 employed (in full-time equivalents) 
4.68 million people in 2000, representing 4.4 percent of all business-
sector employees in the United States, 3.67 million (3.5 percent) in 
2003, and 3.76 million (3.5 percent) in 2006 (BEA 2009).
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 show the changes in employment and real wag-
es (in 2000 dollars) in four main ICT industry classifi cations. As shown 
in Figure 1.5, employment in each of these four industry classifi cations 
increased substantially in the last half of the 1990s and peaked in 2001 
with a total employment of 1,658,628, almost 2.4 times the number of 
employees in 1994. From 2001 to 2003, there was a net loss of just over 
320,000 jobs, although more than 140,000 of these jobs were regained 
by 2006. Real wages in all of these classifi cations increased in the latter 
half of the 1990s, and then, for reasons that will be explained in Chapter 
2, spiked in 2000—dramatically in the case of semiconductors and soft-
ware publishing—before falling off sharply with the downturn of 2001 
and showing little if any increase through 2006 (Fig. 1.6).
Employees in ICT industries earn, on average, much more than 
those in most other sectors of the economy. In 2006 the average annual 
incomes (in current dollars) of U.S. ICT employees were $111,212 in 
software publishing, $77,915 in semiconductors, $76,462 in custom 
computer programming services, $73,497 in computer system design 
services, and $62,620 in data processing, hosting, and related services 
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(U.S. Census Bureau 2008a).5 In 2006 a full-time equivalent employee 
in U.S. ICT-producing industries had 56 percent higher average com-
pensation than a full-time equivalent employee in U.S. business sector 
goods-producing industries in general (BEA 2009). Following the ICT 
downturn in 2001–2002 and the “jobless recovery” of 2003–2004, ICT-
producing industries had real growth in output of 13.3 percent in 2005 
and 12.5 percent in 2006. The value-added of ICT-producing industries 
was 3.9 percent in 2006, contributing 14.2 percent of real GDP growth 
in the U.S. economy (Howells and Barefoot 2007). 
Although the United States remains the world leader in ICT indus-
tries, it nevertheless has been running trade defi cits in ICT goods, 
as shown in Table 1.4. The U.S. Census Bureau categorizes trade in 
Advanced Technology Products into 10 categories: Biotechnology, 
























NOTE: SIC classifi cations for 1994–1997 and NAICS classifi cations for 1998–2006: 
Semiconductors and related devices: SIC 3674, NAICS 334413; Software publish-
ing: SIC 7372, NAICS 511210 and 334611; Computer programming services: SIC 
7371, NAICS 541511; Computer system design: SIC 7373 plus half of 7379, NAICS 
54152.
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2008a).
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Life Science, Opt-Electronics, Information and Technology, Electron-
ics, Flexible Manufacturing, Advanced Materials, Aerospace, Weap-
ons, and Nuclear Technology. Except for Aerospace exports in 2006 
and 2007, ICT exports have been greater than every other category 
of exports since 2002, and ICT imports have been fi ve to seven times 
greater than the next largest categories, Electronics and Aerospace. A 
substantial portion of these ICT trade defi cits refl ect the globalization 
of investment and employment in ICT value chains, with U.S.-based 
multinational companies playing leading roles. It cannot, therefore, be 
assumed that the trade defi cit measures a lack of competitiveness of 
U.S.-based companies in ICT industries. 
Indeed, in the fi rst half of the 2000s, U.S. ICT industries remained 
highly innovative. U.S.-based ICT fi rms accounted for 26.0 percent of 
all company-funded research and development (R&D) in the United 
States in 2000 and 31.2 percent in 2001 (Henry and Dalton 2003, p. 
18). At the beginning of 2003, ICT companies employed 40 percent of 
Figure 1.6  Real Wages (in 2000 dollars) in Four ICT Industrial 
Classifi cations, 1994–2006
NOTE: See Figure 1.5 for SIC and NAICS classifi cations.
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the 1,075,500 full-time equivalent research and development (R&D) 
scientists and engineers in the U.S. business sector (National Science 
Foundation 2003). Table 1.5 shows R&D expenditures of the U.S. ICT 
companies that were among the top 100 globally in R&D spending in 
2006. 
Firm-level R&D spending is infl uenced by, among other factors, the 
technologies that a company develops and the product markets in which 
it competes. Note, for example, the high levels of R&D as a percent 
of sales for semiconductor companies such as Intel, Texas Instruments 
(TI), Qualcomm (the design of integrated circuits for code division mul-
tiple access [CDMA] wireless devices that the company pioneered rep-
resents a major part of its business), Advanced Micro Devices (AMD), 
and Broadcom. IBM and Hewlett-Packard (HP), the two largest ICT 
companies by total sales revenues, had by far the lowest levels of R&D 
as a percentage of sales and R&D dollars spent per employee. As we 
will see in Chapter 3, the limited extent to which IBM and HP allocate 
resources to R&D in the 2000s is the direct result of their transforma-
tions from OEBM to NEBM. 
Whether they are U.S.-based or foreign, ICT companies are the 
leading patenters in the United States. IBM has been the top patenter 
every year since 1993, with Canon being either second or third. In 2007 
IBM (USA) had 3,148 U.S. patents, Samsung (South Korea) 2,725, 
Canon (Japan) 1,987, Matsushita (Japan) 1,941, Intel (USA) 1,865, 
Microsoft (USA) 1,637, Toshiba (Japan) 1,549, Sony (Japan) 1,481, 










ICT as % 
of ATP 
exports
ICT as % 
of ATP 
imports
ICT as % 
of U.S. 
ATP defi cit
2002 53.3 100.7 −47.4 29.6 51.8 285.6
2003 53.1 110.1 −57.0 29.5 53.2 212.4
2004 59.3 132.5 −73.2 29.4 55.6 198.7
2005 64.1 147.2 −83.1 29.7 56.7 190.2
2006 69.2 160.8 −91.6 27.4 55.3 240.3
2007 74.8 179.7 −104.9 27.4 55.0 196.2
Table 1.4  U.S. Exports and Imports of ICT Products, Relative to All 
Advanced Technology Products (ATP), 2002–2007
SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau (2008b).
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Table 1.5  U.S. ICT Companies among the Global Top 100 R&D Spenders, 2005 and 2006
Global rank
R&D expenditures 
($m) R&D as % of sales
R&D expenditures 
per employee ($000s)
ICT Company 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005
Microsoft 5 7 7,121 6,584 13.9 14.9 90 93
Intel 12 14 5,873 5,145 16.6 13.3 62 52
IBM 14 11 5,682 5,378 6.2 5.9 16 16
Motorola 22 24 4,106 3,680 9.6 10.0 62 53
Cisco Systems 23 30 4,067 3,322 14.3 13.4 81 86
Hewlett-Packard 28 26 3,561 3,490 3.9 4.0 23 23
Oracle 48 55 2,195 1,872 12.2 13.0 29 33
Texas Instruments 50 51 2,190 2,015 15.4 15.1 71 57
Sun Microsystems 56 49 2,008 2,046 14.5 15.7 53 54
Qualcomm 66 89 1,516 1,011 20.1 17.8 135 109
EMC 77 90 1,254 1,005 11.2 10.4 40 38
Google 79 119 1,218 578 11.5 9.4 114 102
Advanced Micro Devices 80 77 1,205 1,144 21.3 19.6 73 116
Applied Materials 86 95 1,138 941 12.4 13.5 81 73
Broadcom 89 115 1,117 681 30.5 25.5 213 159
Electronic Arts 95 108 1,041 758 33.7 25.7 132 105
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NOTE:Microsoft, Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and Electronic Arts all have fi scal years that end in the fi rst half of the year. For these 
companies the data for 2006 are for the fi scal year ended in the fi rst half of 2007 and the data for 2005 are for the fi scal year ended in 
the fi rst half of 2006. In 2005 Freescale Semiconductor was ranked 74th and Lucent Technologies 75th among global R&D spenders. 
R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales were 20.3 percent at Freescale and 12.5 percent at Lucent. R&D expenditures per 
employee were $52,000 at Freescale and $39,000 at Lucent. In December 2006 Freescale was taken private and Lucent was acquired 
by Alcatel; hence comparable data for these companies for 2006 are not available.
SOURCE: Hira and Ross (2007).
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10 patenters, Matsushita, Samsung, and Sony are partially in ICT, and 
the other seven, including the fi ve U.S.-based companies, are primarily 
or wholly in ICT. Other U.S.-based ICT companies that were among 
the top 35 patenters in 2007 were TI (seventeenth with 752 patents), 
Sun Microsystems (twenty-sixth, 610), Cisco Systems (twenty-seventh, 
582), Broadcom (thirty-fi rst, 533), and Xerox (thirty-third, 517) (IFI 
Patent Intelligence 2008).
ICT products contribute to productivity throughout the U.S. economy. 
In a review of the book Manufacturing Matters, by Cohen and Zysman 
(1987), Robert Solow (1987) observed that, despite the authors’ cen-
tral belief that computerized manufacturing would produce a break 
with past patterns of productivity growth, how effectively U.S. indus-
try would make use of computer automation remained an open ques-
tion. Solow went on to remark that Cohen and Zysman, “like everyone 
else, are somewhat embarrassed by the fact that what everyone feels to 
have been a technological revolution, a drastic change in our produc-
tive lives, has been accompanied everywhere, including Japan, by a 
slowing-down of productivity growth, not by a step up.” Solow then 
quipped, now rather famously: “You can see the computer age every-
where but in the productivity statistics.” 
Ultimately, however, the failure of the expansion of investment in 
and access to computers to result in productivity growth in the 1980s 
and early 1990s was replaced with an explosion of ICT-related pro-
ductivity growth in the late 1990s and 2000s (Baily and Sichel 2003; 
Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2003; Gordon 2003; Jorgenson 2001; Oliner and 
Sichel 2002; Roach 2003). Why did it take so long for the “computer 
age” to make its mark on productivity growth? 
The key to answering this question is the recognition that produc-
tivity depends on the development and utilization of technology. The 
development of technology in and of itself does not generate productiv-
ity. Indeed, the development of technology lowers productivity because 
it absorbs inputs into economic activity without generating valued out-
puts. An individual, enterprise, region, or nation that develops technol-
ogy realizes productivity over time only when it actually utilizes that 
technology to sell products and generate revenues. In effect, through 
the utilization of technology, the high fi xed costs of the development of 
technology can be transformed into low unit costs (see Lazonick 1991, 
2006, 2008b). Developmental costs, which are included in the econo-
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mist’s conception of fi xed costs, depend on both the size of the invest-
ment in productive resources that is made at a point in time and the 
duration of time over which the productive capability of those resources 
must be developed before they can generate fi nancial returns. 
It is for this reason that it is often necessary for a government to 
make developmental investments in physical infrastructure and a 
knowledge base in order to induce business enterprises (which by defi -
nition must generate profi ts to survive) to enter an industry that is based 
on new technology. The U.S. government played a fundamental role in 
funding the computer revolution. Without the backing of the develop-
mental state, the microelectronics revolution would not have occurred 
(Braun and MacDonald 1982; Flamm 1987, 1988; Lécuyer 2006; Les-
lie 1993a,b; Mowery and Langlois 1996; National Research Council 
1999; Tilton 1971).6 
As they developed, the ICT industries created a demand for edu-
cation and research in science and engineering, with externalities for 
other sectors of the economy in terms of access to advanced research 
and educated labor (e.g., Lenoir et al. 2003). The evolution in the 1960s 
of what would become known as Silicon Valley also created a demand 
for venture capital that, as I elaborate on in Chapter 2, had emerged by 
the early 1970s as an industry in its own right that was devoted to new 
fi rm formation. 
The NEBM that was put in place in Silicon Valley in the 1970s 
and 1980s also depended on the investment decisions and productive 
resources of Old Economy companies, the most important of which was 
IBM. The world’s leading computer company from the 1950s, IBM’s 
development of the personal computer in the early 1980s based on an 
Intel microprocessor and a Microsoft operating system was the most 
important impetus to the emergence and consolidation of the vertically 
specialized industrial structure that came to characterize NEBM. 
Even in the 1980s, when to a large extent (to paraphrase Solow), 
computers were everywhere but productivity nowhere, the two parts of 
ICT developed separately, with computer production and voice trans-
mission having virtually nothing to do with each other as industries. It 
was only with the introduction of data communications based on packet 
switching that the information and communication technology indus-
tries came together, initially in the second half of the 1980s in the form 
of local area networks and then in the fi rst half of the 1990s in the form 
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of the Internet. Concomitantly, the wireless communications revolution 
was taking place, with “3G” (third-generation) convergence with infor-
mation technology via the Internet in the 2000s. The contribution of 
the ICT industries to productivity growth from the mid-1990s on and 
the subsequent dominance of NEBM over OEBM in the ICT industries 
were part and parcel of the integration of information and communica-
tion technologies in the form of the Internet, giving meaning to the 
letters ICT.
THE TOP 20 OLD ECONOMY AND NEW ECONOMY 
COMPANIES
In 2005 there were 53 companies in the U.S. Fortune 500 that could 
be classifi ed as ICT.7 Combined, these 53 companies had $909 billion 
in revenues and 2.6 million employees. Of these 53 companies, 26, with 
$332 billion in revenues and 871,000 employees, could be defi ned as 
New Economy. Tables 1.6 and 1.7 list the top 20 Old Economy and top 
20 New Economy ICT companies, respectively, by 2005 revenues and 
the number of people these companies had employed over the previous 
decade. For inclusion in Table 1.7 as New Economy, a company had to 
fulfi ll three criteria: 1) have been founded in 1957 or later, 2) not have 
been established by the spin-off of an existing division from an Old 
Economy company, and 3) not have grown through acquisition of, or 
merger with, an Old Economy company (as was the case for Electronic 
Data Systems, Comcast, and IAC, which are included as Old Economy 
companies). 
I have chosen 1957 as the earliest date for inclusion in the New Econ-
omy list because that was the year that eight scientists and engineers left 
Shockley Semiconductor Laboratories in Palo Alto, California—itself 
founded just two years before—to launch Fairchild Semiconductor 
in nearby Mountain View. Fairchild Semiconductor was a division of 
Fairchild Camera and Instrument, based in Long Island, New York. As 
is well known, the creation of Fairchild Semiconductor sparked a chain 
reaction that resulted in the emergence of Silicon Valley as a center for 
the development of microelectronics (Berlin 2005; Kenney 2000; Lécuy-
er 2006; Lee et al. 2000; Lenoir et al. 2003). As I will show in Chapter 
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2, it was fi rst and foremost in Silicon Valley, beginning in the late 1950s, 
that NEBM emerged as a viable, and ultimately dominant, business mod-
el. Note that 14 of the 20 New Economy companies listed in Table 1.7 are 
based in California, and 11 of those are in Silicon Valley. 
Headed by the giants IBM and HP, six of the Old Economy com-
panies in Table 1.6, including Xerox, Electronic Data Systems (EDS), 
First Data, and NCR, are strictly information technology companies.8 
The two semiconductor companies, TI and Freescale Semiconductor, 
supply chips to both the information technology and communication 
technology sectors of ICT but with an emphasis on communications 
applications. TI’s major business is designing digital signal processing 
chips for the cell-phone industry, whereas Freescale is a 2004 spinoff 
of the wireless communications technology company Motorola. Along 
with Motorola in the communications equipment segment of ICT is 
Lucent Technologies, which was spun off from AT&T Corp. in 1996 
and was merged with the French telecommunications equipment com-
pany Alcatel to become Alcatel-Lucent in 2006.9 
The remaining 10 companies in Table 1.6 are communications ser-
vice providers. Five of them are direct descendents of the old Bell Sys-
tem that, until its breakup on January 1, 1984, functioned as a regulated 
monopoly in the provision of local and long distance telephone services. 
AT&T, the parent company within the Bell System, included regional 
operating companies throughout the United States. AT&T’s wholly 
owned subsidiary, Western Electric, manufactured equipment for the 
Bell System, while Bell Labs, the world famous research organization 
jointly owned by AT&T and Western Electric, engaged in basic and 
applied scientifi c research. The breakup of the Bell System separated 
seven regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs) from AT&T Corp., 
which now included Western Electric and Bell Labs within its internal 
organization as its AT&T Technologies division. The seven RBOCS 
were Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX, Pacifi c Telesis 
(PacTel), Southwestern Bell Corp. (SBC), and US West. Subsequently 
Bell Atlantic and NYNEX were merged into Verizon; Ameritech, Pacif-
ic Telesis, and AT&T Corp. into SBC, which in 2005 changed its name 
to AT&T Inc.; and US West into Qwest. In December 2006 AT&T Inc. 
acquired BellSouth, so that in the 23 years since the breakup of the Bell 
System, AT&T Corp. and the seven RBOCs had become consolidated 
into three companies: AT&T Inc., Verizon, and Qwest.10
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employeeOld Economy companies 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
International Business Machines 
(1911; NY; 10)
91.1 240,615 316,309 319,876 315,889 319,273 329,001 329,373 $277,000 
Hewlett-Packard (1939; CA; 11) 86.7 112,000 88,500 86,200 141,000 142,000 151,000 150,000 $578,000 
Verizon Communications 
(1885; NY; 18)
75.1 62,600 260,000 247,000 229,500 203,100 210,000 217,000 $346,000 
AT&T Inc.a (1885; TX; 39) 43.9 61,540 220,090 193,420 175,400 168,950 162,000 189,950 $231,000 
Motorola (1928; IL; 54) 36.8 139,000 147,000 111,000 97,000 88,000 68,000 69,000 $533,000 
Sprint Nextelb (1899; KS; 59) 34.7 48,024 84,100 83,700 72,200 66,900 59,900 79,900 $434,000 
Comcastc (1963; PA; 194) 22.3 16,400 35,000 38,000 82,000 68,000 74,000 80,000 $279,000 
BellSouth (1885; GA; 106) 20.6 81,241 103,900 87,875 77,000 76,000 62,564 63066 $326,000 
Electronic Data Systemsd
(1962; TX; 108)
20.5 100,000 122,000 143,000 137,000 132,000 117,000 117,000 $175,000 
Xerox (1906; CT; 142) 15.7 86,700 92,500 78,900 67,800 61,100 58,100 55,200 $284,000 
Qwest Communications 
(1885; CO; 160)
13.9 720 67,000 61,000 47,000 47,000 41,401 39,348 $353,000 
Texas Instruments 
(1930; TX; 167)
13.4 59,927 42,481 34,724 34,589 34,154 35,472 35,207 $381,000 
DirecTV Group (1932; CA; 168) 13.2 86,000 9,000 13,700 11,600 12,300 11,800 9,200 $1,435,000 
First Data (1871; CO; 224) 10.5 40000 27000 29000 29000 29000 32000 33000 $318,000 
Alltel (1943; AR; 251) 9.5 16,307 27,257 23,955 25,348 19,986 18,598 21,373 $444,000 
Lucent Technologies 
(1869; NJ; 255)
9.4 124,000 126,000 77,000 47,000 34,500 31,800 30,500 $308,000 
Table 1.6  Employment, 1996 and 2000–2005, at the Top 20 Old Economy Companies by 2005 Sales
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Table 1.5  U.S. ICT Companies among the Global Top 100 R&D Spenders, 2005 and 2006
Global rank
R&D expenditures 
($m) R&D as % of sales
R&D expenditures 
per employee ($000s)
ICT Company 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005 2006 2005
Microsoft 5 7 7,121 6,584 13.9 14.9 90 93
Intel 12 14 5,873 5,145 16.6 13.3 62 52
IBM 14 11 5,682 5,378 6.2 5.9 16 16
Motorola 22 24 4,106 3,680 9.6 10.0 62 53
Cisco Systems 23 30 4,067 3,322 14.3 13.4 81 86
Hewlett-Packard 28 26 3,561 3,490 3.9 4.0 23 23
Oracle 48 55 2,195 1,872 12.2 13.0 29 33
Texas Instruments 50 51 2,190 2,015 15.4 15.1 71 57
Sun Microsystems 56 49 2,008 2,046 14.5 15.7 53 54
Qualcomm 66 89 1,516 1,011 20.1 17.8 135 109
EMC 77 90 1,254 1,005 11.2 10.4 40 38
Google 79 119 1,218 578 11.5 9.4 114 102
Advanced Micro Devices 80 77 1,205 1,144 21.3 19.6 73 116
Applied Materials 86 95 1,138 941 12.4 13.5 81 73
Broadcom 89 115 1,117 681 30.5 25.5 213 159
Electronic Arts 95 108 1,041 758 33.7 25.7 132 105
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NOTE:Microsoft, Oracle, Sun Microsystems, and Electronic Arts all have fi scal years that end in the fi rst half of the year. For these 
companies the data for 2006 are for the fi scal year ended in the fi rst half of 2007 and the data for 2005 are for the fi scal year ended in 
the fi rst half of 2006. In 2005 Freescale Semiconductor was ranked 74th and Lucent Technologies 75th among global R&D spenders. 
R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales were 20.3 percent at Freescale and 12.5 percent at Lucent. R&D expenditures per 
employee were $52,000 at Freescale and $39,000 at Lucent. In December 2006 Freescale was taken private and Lucent was acquired 
by Alcatel; hence comparable data for these companies for 2006 are not available.
SOURCE: Hira and Ross (2007).
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employeeOld Economy companies 1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
International Business Machines 
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91.1 240,615 316,309 319,876 315,889 319,273 329,001 329,373 $277,000 
Hewlett-Packard (1939; CA; 11) 86.7 112,000 88,500 86,200 141,000 142,000 151,000 150,000 $578,000 
Verizon Communications 
(1885; NY; 18)
75.1 62,600 260,000 247,000 229,500 203,100 210,000 217,000 $346,000 
AT&T Inc.a (1885; TX; 39) 43.9 61,540 220,090 193,420 175,400 168,950 162,000 189,950 $231,000 
Motorola (1928; IL; 54) 36.8 139,000 147,000 111,000 97,000 88,000 68,000 69,000 $533,000 
Sprint Nextelb (1899; KS; 59) 34.7 48,024 84,100 83,700 72,200 66,900 59,900 79,900 $434,000 
Comcastc (1963; PA; 194) 22.3 16,400 35,000 38,000 82,000 68,000 74,000 80,000 $279,000 
BellSouth (1885; GA; 106) 20.6 81,241 103,900 87,875 77,000 76,000 62,564 63066 $326,000 
Electronic Data Systemsd
(1962; TX; 108)
20.5 100,000 122,000 143,000 137,000 132,000 117,000 117,000 $175,000 
Xerox (1906; CT; 142) 15.7 86,700 92,500 78,900 67,800 61,100 58,100 55,200 $284,000 
Qwest Communications 
(1885; CO; 160)
13.9 720 67,000 61,000 47,000 47,000 41,401 39,348 $353,000 
Texas Instruments 
(1930; TX; 167)
13.4 59,927 42,481 34,724 34,589 34,154 35,472 35,207 $381,000 
DirecTV Group (1932; CA; 168) 13.2 86,000 9,000 13,700 11,600 12,300 11,800 9,200 $1,435,000 
First Data (1871; CO; 224) 10.5 40000 27000 29000 29000 29000 32000 33000 $318,000 
Alltel (1943; AR; 251) 9.5 16,307 27,257 23,955 25,348 19,986 18,598 21,373 $444,000 
Lucent Technologies 
(1869; NJ; 255)
9.4 124,000 126,000 77,000 47,000 34,500 31,800 30,500 $308,000 
Table 1.6  Employment, 1996 and 2000–2005, at the Top 20 Old Economy Companies by 2005 Sales
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NOTE: In parentheses: year of founding, state in which headquartered, and rank in 2006 Fortune 500 list. Included in the ICT industries are 
companies that the Fortune 500 2006 list classifi es as being in the following industries: Computer Peripherals, Computer Software, Com-
puters, Offi ce Equipment, Financial Data Services, Information Technology Services, Internet Services and Retailing, Network and Other 
Communications Equipment, Semiconductors and Other Electronic Components, and Telecommunications. Blank = not applicable.
a In 2005 SBC Communications, founded in Texas in 1885 and ranked 33rd on the Fortune 500 list, acquired AT&T, founded in 1877 and 
ranted 56th on the 2005 list. SBC then changed its name to AT&T Inc. Employment fi gures for 1996 and 2000–2004 are for SBC. AT&T 
Corp.’s employment fi gures were: 1996, 130,000; 2000, 166,000; 2001, 117,800; 2002, 71,000; 2003, 61,000; and 2004, 47,565.
b In August 2005 Sprint, 65th on the Fortune 500 2005 list, acquired Nextel, founded in 1987 and 157th on the 2005 list.
c Comcast began its transformation into the largest Internet cable company in the United States through its acquisition of subscribers from 
AT&T Broadband in 2000–2001.
d General Motors bought Electronic Data Systems in 1984 and spun it off as an independent company in 1996.
e In 1998 HSN (formed out of Home Shopping Network) purchased USA Networks, which had been owned by Paramount and MCA. In 
the early 2000s, the company changed its name, fi rst to USA Interactive and then to IAC/InterActiveCorp.
f In late 2004 Motorola spun off its semiconductor division as Freescale Semiconductor.
SOURCE: Fortune (2006); hoovers.com; S&P Compustat database.
Cox Communications (1898; 
GA; 273)
9.0 7,200 19,000 20,700 21,600 22,150 22,350 22,530 $399,000 
IAC/InterActiveCorpe 
(1977; NY; 313)
7.1 4,750 20,780 16,900 23,200 25,700 26,000 28,000 $254,000 
NCR (1884; OH; 357) 6.0 38,600 32,900 31,400 30,100 29,000 28,500 28,200 $213,000 
Freescale Semiconductorf 
(1928; TX; 368)
5.8 22,700 $256,000 
Averages (per fi rm, except 
sales per employee)
27.3 72,808 96,885 89,334 87,621 83,111 81,062 81,027 $391,000 
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New Economy Companies  1996 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Dell Computer (1984; TX; 25) 55.9 8,400 36,500 40,000 34,600 39,100 55,200 65,200 $857,000 
Microsoft (1975; WA; 48) 39.8 20,561 39,100 47,600 50,500 55,000 57,000 61,000 $652,000 
Intel (1968; CA; 49) 38.8 48,500 86,100 83,400 78,700 79,700 85,000 99,900 $388,888 
Cisco Systems (1984; CA; 83) 24.8 8,782 34,000 38,000 36,000 34,000 34,000 38,413 $646,000 
Computer Sciences 
(1959; CA; 141)
15.8 33,850 58,000 68,000 67,000 90,000 90,000 79,000 $200,000 
Apple Computer 
(1977; CA; 159)
13.9 10,896 8,568 9,603 10,211 10,912 12,561 15,810 $879,000 
Oracle (1977; CA; 196) 11.8 23,111 41,320 42,297 42,006 40,650 41,658 49,872 $236,000 
Sanmina-SCI (1980; CA; 198) 11.7 1,726 24,000 48,774 46,030 45,008 42,115 42,821 $273,000 
Sun Microsystems 
(1982; CA; 211)
11.1 17,400 38,900 43,700 39,400 36,100 32,600 31,000 $358,000 
Solectron (1977; CA; 227) 10.5 10,781 65,273 60,000 73,000 66,000 59,500 47,000 $223,000 
EMC (1979; MA; 249) 9.7 4,800 24,100 20,100 17,400 20,000 22,700 21,000 $462,000 
Amazon.com (1994; WA; 272) 8.5 151 9,000 7,800 7,500 7,800 9,000 12,000 $708,000 
EchoStar Communications 
(1993; CO; 273)
8.4 1,200 11,000 11,000 15,000 15,000 20,000 21,000 $400,000 
SAIC (1969; CA; 285) 8.0 20,931 39,078 41,500 40,400 38,700 44,900 43,800 $183,000 
Jabil Circuit (1966; FL; 303) 7.5 2,649 19,115 17,097 20,000 26,000 34,000 40,000 $188,000 
Applied Materials 
(1967; CA; 317)
7.0 11,403 19,220 17,365 16,077 12,050 12,960 12,750 $549,000 
Google (1998; CA; 353) 6.1 1,628 3,021 5,680 $1,074,000 
Table 1.7  Employment, 1996 and 2000–2005, at the Top 20 New Economy Companies by 2005 Sales
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NOTE: In parentheses: year of founding, state in which headquartered, and rank in 2006 Fortune 500 list. Included in the ICT industries 
are companies that the Fortune 500 2006 list classifi es as being in the following industries: Computer Peripherals, Computer Software, 
Computers, Offi ce Equipment, Financial Data Services, Information Technology Services, Internet Services and Retailing, Network 
and Other Communications Equipment, Semiconductors and Other Electronic Components, and Telecommunications. Blank = not ap-
plicable.
SOURCE: Fortune (2006); hoovers.com; S&P Compustat database.
Advanced Micro Devices 
(1969; CA; 367)
5.8 12,200 14,696 14,415 12,146 14,300 15,900 15,900 $365,000 
Qualcomm (1985; CA; 381) 5.7 6,000 6,300 6,500 8,100 7,400 7,600 9,300 $613,000 
Yahoo! (1995; CA; 412) 5.3 155 3,259 3,000 3,600 5,500 7,600 9,800 $541,000 
Averages (per fi rm, except 
sales per employee)
15.3 12,816 30,396 32,640 32,509 32,242 34,366 36,062 $424,000 
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In contrast, only three of the top 20 New Economy companies are 
clearly communications technology companies: Cisco Systems, which 
makes Internet routers and switches; EchoStar Communications, a 
major force in satellite television11; and Qualcomm, a wireless equip-
ment manufacturer. Even so, Cisco’s rise to dominance in its industry 
derives from its development of software that has enabled the conver-
gence of information and communication technology—what is called 
the “triple play” of voice, data, and video—using the same infrastruc-
tures and equipment. The evolution of those infrastructures and equip-
ment has depended critically on the development of ever more power-
ful, compact, and affordable computers—in short, the microelectronics 
revolution. At the center of this revolution were the hardware company, 
Intel, and the software company, Microsoft, both of which grew large 
supplying crucial inputs to the IBM personal computer (PC) and what 
used to be called its clones, including Dell Computer, no. 1 on the New 
Economy list. AMD, founded in Silicon Valley a year after Intel, sus-
tained its growth for decades by serving as a second source for the sup-
ply of Intel chips, although in recent years it has increasingly been com-
peting head-to-head with Intel with its own chip designs. 
Applied Materials is the world’s largest maker of semiconductor 
production equipment, while Solectron (since 2007 part of Flextron-
ics), Sanmina-SCI, and Jabil Circuit are among the world’s leading 
electronic manufacturing service (EMS) providers, supplying printed 
circuit boards and other components to companies such as IBM, HP, 
Dell, and Cisco. Other companies have established their own distinctive 
niches in the information technology sector, such as Apple in innova-
tive computer products, Sun Microsystems in computer workstations, 
and EMC in information management and storage. Oracle is the leader 
in database management software, while Computer Sciences (CS) and 
SAIC line up behind “Old Economy” EDS in providing information 
technology services. Finally, Amazon.com, Google, and Yahoo! are, 
along with “Old Economy” IAC, in the Fortune industry classifi ca-
tion “Internet Services and Retailing,” which was newly created for the 
2005 list. The revenues that each of them generated in 2005 put them 
on the top 20 New Economy list for the fi rst time (compare Lazonick 
2007b, pp. 67–68).
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NEBM AS A FORCE FOR UNSTABLE AND INEQUITABLE 
ECONOMIC GROWTH
The basic thesis of this book is that the demise of OEBM and its 
replacement by NEBM together represent important parts of the expla-
nation for the trend toward greater employment instability and income 
inequality in the U.S. economy over the past three decades—a reversal 
of the trend toward more stable and more equitable economic growth 
in the three decades after World War II. While NEBM has been evolv-
ing since the 1960s in ICT industries, the Internet boom and bust of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s was pivotal in the replacement of OEBM by 
NEBM as the dominant mode of business organization. 
New Economy companies such as Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, Sun 
Microsystems, and Cisco Systems grew on the basis of NEBM. Among 
the major Old Economy companies, IBM led the shift to NEBM during 
the 1990s as it changed its product market strategy from lower mar-
gin hardware to higher margin software and services; its R&D orienta-
tion from proprietary technology systems to open technology systems, 
with extensive patenting as a source of leverage in cross-licensing and 
strategic alliances with other companies; its fi nancial behavior from 
providing stable dividend yields to shareholders to boosting its stock 
price through massive stock repurchases; and its employment relations 
from its signature “lifelong employment” system with defi ned-benefi t 
pensions to a focus on fl exibility in the employment of labor, includ-
ing the move to portable pension systems designed to be attractive to 
younger, highly mobile employees. During the late 1990s, other major 
Old Economy ICT companies such as Lucent, Xerox, Motorola, TI, and 
HP adopted aspects of NEBM, and with the sharp downturn of the early 
2000s, NEBM became the norm for all ICT companies. In this book, 
I document this shift to NEBM in the ICT industries and analyze its 
implications for the possibilities for sustainable prosperity in the United 
States. 
Chapter 2 provides a historical analysis of the rise of NEBM, from 
its origins in Silicon Valley in the 1960s to its consolidation as the dom-
inant business model in ICT in the Internet boom of the late 1990s. I 
stress the role of the stock market in facilitating the reallocation of capi-
tal and labor from the security of the Old Economy in which established 
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corporations dominated to the insecurity of the New Economy with its 
waves of start-ups. Facilitating the reallocation of capital was the emer-
gence of NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Auto-
mated Quotations), a national electronic stock market with much laxer 
listing requirements than the Old Economy New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). Facilitating the reallocation of labor was the transformation 
of the employee stock option from a means of increasing the after-tax 
income of top executives under OEBM to a mode of luring a broad base 
of professional, technical, and administrative employees from secure 
employment under OEBM to insecure employment under NEBM.
Chapter 3 analyzes how major Old Economy companies—with 
a focus on the important cases of IBM, HP, and Lucent Technolo-
gies—restructured in attempts (in the case of Lucent unsuccessful) to 
make the transition from OEBM to NEBM. With its central positions 
in both Old Economy mainframes and New Economy PCs, in the early 
1990s IBM proactively, dramatically, and successfully made the transi-
tion from OEBM to NEBM. So too did HP, beginning with its 1999 
spinoff of Agilent—the original business that William Hewlett and 
David Packard had built—to focus on its open systems printer busi-
ness, launched about 15 years earlier. In contrast, Lucent Technologies, 
the 1996 spinoff from AT&T that housed the famed Bell Labs and that 
was the largest telecommunications equipment company in the world in 
1999, almost destroyed itself trying to adopt elements of NEBM and a 
decade later was a subsidiary of a French company, Alcatel-Lucent. All 
three cases in this chapter demonstrate the greatly heightened employ-
ment insecurity that the transition from OEBM to NEBM entails. In the 
cases of IBM and HP, we see that even when Old Economy corpora-
tions have made a successful transition to NEBM, employment inse-
curity increases. In the case of Lucent, we see the disastrous results of 
an Old Economy company in which top executives became fi xated on 
the company’s stock price as the measure of economic performance but 
failed to make the transition to NEBM.
Chapter 4 analyzes the relations between employment security and 
retirement security under both OEBM and NEBM. Under OEBM, the 
traditional nonportable, “back-loaded” defi ned-benefi t pension plan 
encouraged employees to remain with a company for a career. In mak-
ing the transition to NEBM, some Old Economy companies adopted 
portable but still defi ned-benefi t cash-balance plans that favored the 
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employment of younger workers, often as a prelude to replacing a cash-
balance plan with a portable defi ned-contribution 401(k) plan. In con-
trast, most New Economy companies such as Microsoft, Oracle, Cisco, 
and Dell have offered their employees only defi ned-contribution plans 
over the course of their corporate histories. Many Old Economy compa-
nies have used existing defi ned-benefi t pensions as a tool for downsiz-
ing the labor force by means of early retirement schemes that enhance 
the value of one’s pension. By the mid-2000s, most Old Economy cor-
porations offered only defi ned-contribution plans to new hires and, at 
some companies, even to all employees. The major exceptions can be 
found in those ICT companies in which industrial unions have remained 
strong as collective-bargaining agents. Under NEBM, members of the 
U.S. high-tech labor force confront a high-quality, low-wage global-
ized labor supply with no effective collective institutions to protect their 
conditions of work and pay.
Chapter 5 analyzes the forces that have underpinned the globaliza-
tion of the ICT labor force. Since the 1960s the development strate-
gies of national governments and indigenous businesses in many Asian 
nations have interacted with the investment strategies of U.S.-based 
ICT companies as well as U.S. immigration policy to generate a global 
high-tech labor supply. This process has entailed fl ows of U.S. capital 
to Asian labor as well as fl ows of Asian labor to U.S. capital. As a result, 
new possibilities to pursue high-tech careers, and thereby develop pro-
ductive capabilities, have opened up to vast numbers of individuals in 
many Asian nations. By the same token, it is increasingly the case that 
members of the U.S. high-tech labor force must compete for jobs with 
highly qualifi ed, but often much less expensive, labor situated halfway 
around the world. With the acceleration of offshoring in the 2000s, even 
well-educated and highly experienced members of the U.S. ICT labor 
force are facing unprecedented economic insecurity. Under these condi-
tions, what is needed in the United States is the creation of employment 
opportunities that can make full use of the productive capabilities of 
educated and experienced U.S. high-tech labor.
Chapter 6 shows that, driven by a pervasive, but theoretically unten-
able, ideology that corporations should be run to maximize shareholder 
value, top executives of ICT companies have chosen to allocate corpo-
rate resources in a way that, at best, fails to support and, at worst, under-
mines the ability of members of the U.S. high-tech labor force to com-
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pete with a global labor supply without sacrifi cing their standards of 
living. Rather than use the profi ts of globalization to upgrade the capa-
bilities of the U.S. high-tech labor and to create new opportunities for 
creative employment at home, top executives have become obsessed (if 
I may use such a psychological term) with allocating corporate fi nancial 
resources to buying back their companies’ own stock. I argue that the 
only purpose of stock repurchases is to boost a company’s stock price, 
and that, as recipients of abundant stock option awards, the top execu-
tives who decide to buy back stock are themselves prime benefi ciaries 
of these corporate allocation decisions. 
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses the implications for sustainable pros-
perity of the rise and dominance of NEBM. With the transformation of 
employment relations, the globalization of the high-tech labor force, 
and the corporate commitment to maximizing shareholder value, well-
educated and highly experienced members of the U.S. high-tech labor 
force are facing economic insecurity, even when the U.S. ICT corpora-
tions that could provide them with stable and remunerative employ-
ment opportunities are highly profi table. In terms of their accumulated 
capabilities, these ICT personnel should be among the best-positioned 
in the U.S. labor force to fi nd stable and remunerative employment. 
Yet, notwithstanding the existence of older underemployed and unem-
ployed high-tech workers, high-tech executives perpetually claim that 
there is a shortage of capable STEM (science, technology, engineer-
ing, and mathematics) labor in the United States. What these executives 
actually want is a large supply of younger workers who will work long 
hours for less pay. 
These executives go on to blame an underperforming U.S. K–12 
education system for failing to generate this abundant labor supply. The 
U.S. government does need to remain committed to investment in the 
nation’s educational infrastructure. Government investment, however, 
will not in and of itself generate sustainable prosperity. The achieve-
ment of stable and equitable economic growth, both for existing mem-
bers of the U.S. high-tech labor force and for those segments of U.S. 
society who have been left behind, will require a confrontation with 
the destructive “shareholder-value” ideology that currently guides the 
resource allocation decisions of U.S. business corporations. 
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Notes
 1. In the early 1950s, the sociologist C. Wright Mills (1951) had written an infl uen-
tial academic treatise on the signifi cance of the “white collar” employee. William 
H. Whyte, who wrote his best-selling The Organization Man while an editor of 
Fortune, later became a prominent urban sociologist. Whyte’s characterization of 
“The Organization Man” has often been interpreted as pejorative, the victim of 
the bureaucratic suppression of rugged individualism. Whyte himself, however, 
denied this interpretation. In a 1982 interview, Whyte stated: “I didn’t mean The 
Organization Man as a pejorative work. . . . After all, I’ve been an organization 
man myself in some very good organizations. And I don’t think one loses grace by 
being a member of an organization. Yet many people interpreted this thing on its 
own, not having read it, as an attack on modern American life. That anybody who 
worked for a corporation had lost his soul. And I meant no such thing.” Interview 
by Richard H. Heffner on “The Open Mind” October 15, 1982, available at http://
www.theopenmind.tv/searcharchive_episode_transcript.asp?id=1509 (accessed 
June 26, 2009).
 2. In Jeremy Siegel’s well-known book, Stocks for the Long Run, now in its fourth 
edition, there is only one passing reference to stock buybacks (Siegel 2008, p. 98), 
notwithstanding the fact that, since the late 1990s, repurchases have become the 
major mode of distributing corporate revenues to shareholders. 
 3. The Department of Commerce (2003) described these industries as IT. I use the 
term ICT to describe the same set of industries in order to highlight the orga-
nizational separation of information and communication technologies in OEBM 
and the ongoing convergence of information and communication technologies that 
characterizes NEBM. 
 4. The BEA defi nes ICT-producing industries as consisting of computer and elec-
tronic products, publishing industries (includes software), information and data 
processing services, and computer systems design and related services.
 5. U.S. Census Bureau (2008a, 1994–1997 data: http://censtats.census.gov/cbpsic/
cbpsic.shtml; 1998–2006 data: http://censtats.census.gov/cbpnaic/cbpnaic.shtml).
 6. See also Hambrecht (1984) for the views of a prominent Silicon Valley investment 
banker.
 7. Given the gestation period of this book, I have organized collection of data around 
the top 20 OEBM and NEBM companies by revenues in 2005, taken from the 
Fortune 500 list published in 2006. The top 20 lists for 2007, taken from the For-
tune 500 list published in 2008, have 15 of the same Old Economy companies and 
18 of the same New Economy companies as in Tables 1.6 and 1.7, respectively. 
Gone from the Old Economy list in 2007 are BellSouth (acquired by AT&T Inc. in 
December 2006), Lucent Technologies (acquired by Alcatel in December 2006 to 
become Alcatel-Lucent), Cox Communications (taken private in December 2004 
and included on the Fortune 500 list in 2005 but not thereafter), NCR (which with 
$6.2 billion in revenues in 2007 did not make the top 20 Old Economy list), and 
Freescale Semiconductor (taken private in December 2006). In place of these fi ve 
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companies on the 2007 Old Economy list are Liberty Media (thirteenth), Auto-
matic Data Processing (fourteenth), Liberty Global (fi fteenth), Virgin Media (sev-
enteenth), and Embarq (twentieth, a spinoff of Sprint Nextel’s local telephone 
business in May 2006). Liberty Media, Liberty Global, and Virgin Media are all 
new companies with Old Economy roots. Gone from the New Economy list in 
2007 are Solectron (acquired by Flextronics, based in Singapore, in October 2007) 
and AMD (which with $6.0 billion in revenues in 2007 did not make the top 20 
list). Their replacements on the 2007 New Economy list are eBay (eighteenth) and 
Cablevision Systems (twentieth).
 8. HP acquired EDS in August 2008 in a $13.9 billion deal.
 9. In 2000, Lucent spun off Avaya, an enterprise networking company that, with 
$4.9 billion in revenues and 18,555 employees, ranked 434th in the Fortune 500 
in 2005, and in 2001, it spun off Agere Systems, a communications chips company 
that, with $1.7 billion in revenues and 6,200 employees, ranked 904th in the For-
tune 1000 in 2005.
 10.  With the growth of wireless communications, in 2001 AT&T Corp. spun off 
AT&T Wireless as a separate company, while in the same year, SBC and Bell 
South created the wireless company Cingular as a joint venture. In 2004 Cingular 
acquired AT&T Wireless. In December 2006, AT&T Inc. (formerly SBC) acquired 
BellSouth, and as a result Cingular, renamed AT&T Mobility, is now wholly 
owned by AT&T Inc.
 11. On January 1, 2008, EchoStar Communications changed its name to DISH Net-
work, while spinning off some of its businesses as EchoStar Corporation.
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